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Announcements by Officials

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In early February 1952 an official of the North Korean Labor Party arrived in Ch'angnung-ni (126-25, 37-53) (BS-7396) and delivered a lecture on the main street to residents of the village. The following are some excerpts from his speech:

"It is the plan of our leaders that absolutely no cease-fire shall be achieved. This year there will be a summer offensive as the first phase of an all-out offensive operation. In case of a temporary failure in this summer operation, our armed forces will be reorganized to start another offensive to occupy all of Korea by the end of this year. Thus, the liberation for which you all aspire will be attained.

"This plan was not devised solely by the North Korean government, but is one which has been worked out by the great Stalin in light of the world situation. For this reason we have nothing to fear. No plan of Stalin's has failed, from the beginning to the end of World War II. The purpose of the present temporary state of affairs in which a cease-fire appears to be imminent is to ascertain the capabilities and will of the United States. No cease-fire will take place. Taking these facts into consideration, you people must put forward your greatest efforts in the spring planting."1

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2. In November 1951 officials of the Myongch'on-gun people's committee in Morth Hamgyong Province stated in public speeches that North Korea would be united with the Chinese Communist government. Other propaganda being spread in late 1951 by the government was that there would never be a third world war because of the power of Soviet Russia, regardless of the outcome of the negotiestons.

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General Propaganda 25X1X

In January 1952 the North Korean government was circulating the following propaganda themes on the cease-fire negotiations:

- a. The United States proposed the negotiations because she needed the time to reinforce her weakened units in the face of Communist strongth, and is delaying the negotiations intentionally so that she may complete her preparations for another offensive.
- b. The United States continues to insist on banning sinfield construction during an armistice because she fears North Korean air power and wants to colonize Korea by interfering in North Korean internal affairs.
- c. The United States arbitrarily objects to the Communist proposals for an allfor-all prisoner of war exchange. No provision for a man-for-man POW exchange
  system can be found in the Geneva Convention. The United States, in insisting
  on the repatriation of civilians who had been rightlets byt later joined us
  of their own free will, is ignoring man's freedom of conscience.
- d. The people of all countries whose sons are fighting in Korea conduct demonstrations almost daily protesting against continuing the war for the sole benefit of the United States.

Some North Koreans regarded the above statements as only the usual propaganda line and believed that the North Korean government was itself delaying the negotiations to gain time to reinforce its armies, would sign a peace only under very favorable conditions, and might mount a new offensive whether on not an armistice was reached.

- 4. North Korean propagands in the Kaesong area has emphasized the term "peace negotiations" in referring to the cease-fire talks. Most Kaesong residents want the talks to fail, since they fear the area will come under North Korean rule if a peace is signed. They do not believe a truce will be reached, however, because the objectives of the parties to the talks vary so widely. Kaesong residents compare unfavorably their present life to that under the ROK government before the war. When they heard that prisoners of war were to be exchanged, some men in Kaesong thought of mixing with ROK prisoners of war so that they could be sent to the ROK in this way
- 5. One North Korean propaganda story being spread widely in P'yongyang in early 1952 was that United States B-C9's raiding the city recently have dropped many dud bombs on the city, the bombs being filled with messages and red flag: from American workers addressed to North Korean workers. The propaganda line is that while capitalists in the United States wish to hinder the negotiations and prolong the war, American laborers are opposed to the war and sabotage the war effort by placing messages and flags in the bombs instead of filling them with emplosives. The population generally did not believe this propaganda, however, because no one had ever seen such bombs and they know that North Korean propaganda has often been false.
  - Comment. Note that the town in which the speech was made is in South nores and near the front lines. Compare the aggressive air of the speech with the North Korean attitude reported in paragraph 4.

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